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Public performances have assumed critical importance in military hostilities 
that remains true today1 with warfare fought both in geophysical places 
and across varied textual, broadcast or internet media.2 This dynamic has
garnered strategic attention among militaries and scholars alike since the 
* © 2020 Prof. Dr. Nikolas M. Rajkovic.   Chair of International Law, Department 
of Public Law and Governance, Tilburg University (The Netherlands). I am grateful 
for the feedback given on earlier drafts by Tanja Aalberts, Jason Beckett, Gleider Hernandez, 
Sofia Stolk, Renske Vos, and Wouter Werner. 
 1. PAUL VIRILIO, WAR AND CINEMA:THE LOGISTICS OF PERCEPTION 7(Patrick Camiller 
trans., Verso 2009). 
2. See MICHAEL ILLON ULIAN ED  & J R ID, THE LIBERAL WAY OF WAR: KILLING TO
MAKE LIFE LIVE 108–12 (Routledge, 2009). 
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First Gulf War and its acknowledged made-for-TV quality.3 Further, the
world’s most powerful militaries have become renowned for their 
preoccupation with “winning” kinetic battles as well as with conquering 
the narrative portrayal of hostilities.4 The famous military axiom of 
controlling the high-ground has expanded beyond topographical geography5 
to include the narrative heights of conflicts.6 The so-called “mission 
accomplishment” requires mastery over two essential and interactive 
confrontations: kinetic and narrative hostilities.7 
While many have written on related notions of  “virtuous war,”8 the “global 
battlefield”9 or “everywhere war,”10 these approaches have focused largely 
on: (a) the heightened prominence and implications of asymmetric warfare; 
and (b) how different technologies and infrastructures are produced to 
enact what Derek Gregory has coined “death from a distance.”11 Military
conflicts have evolved from singular battlefields to a matrix of battlespaces, 
involving multiple sites and dimensions of kinetic and narrative combat.12 
Correspondingly, the model “theatre of hostilities” has expanded its scope 
regarding spaces, actors and actants,13 leaving scholars of international 
3. James Der Derian, Virtuous War/Virtual Theory, 76 INT’L AFF. 771, 772 (2000). 
4. Patrick T. Jackson & Ronald R. Krebs, Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The
Power of Political Rhetoric, 13 EUR. J. OF INT’L REL. 35 (2007). 
5. See MICHAEL HOWARD, WAR AND THE LIBERAL CONSCIENCE 128 (Rutgers Univ.
Press, 1978). 
6. See generally RONALD R. KREBS, NARRATIVE AND THE MAKING OF U.S.
NATIONAL SECURITY (2015) (analyzing how dominant narratives become dominant and 
their influence in the U.S. national security debate); see also Amanda Alexander, The “Good 
War”:Preparations for a War against Civilians, 15 L., CULTURE AND THE HUM. 227, 229 
(2019).
7. Ami Ayalon, Elad Popovich & Moran Yarchi, From Warfare to Imagefare:
How States Should Manage Asymmetric Conflicts with Extensive Media Coverage, 28(2) 
TERRORISM AND POL. VIOLENCE 254, 256 (2016). 
8. See generally  JAMES DER DERIAN, VIRTUOUS WAR: MAPPING THE MILITARY-
INDUSTRIAL MEDIA-ENTERTAINMENT NETWORK (2009) (building upon the existing literature to
discuss the use of new technologies in these “new wars,” characterized by “virtual”
enemies).
9. See generally Noam Lubell & Nathan Derejko, A Global Battlefield? Drones
and the Geographical Scope of Armed Conflict, 11 J. OF INT’L CRIM. JUST. 65, 65–66 (2013) 
(discussing the evolution of the geographic scope of war towards a global battlefield). 
10. See Derek Gregory, The everywhere war, 177 THE GEOGRAPHICAL J. 238 (2011).
11. Derek Gregory, From a View to a Kill: Drones and Late Modern War, 28 
THEORY, CULTURE AND SOC’Y 188, 192 (2011). 
 12. David Kennedy, Modern War and Modern Law, 12 INT’L LEGAL THEORY 55, 74 
(2006).
13. See DAVID KILCULLEN, OUT OF THE MOUNTAINS: THE COMING AGE OF THE URBAN 
GUERRILLA 43–44 (2013). 
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security and international law struggling to keep pace with the pronounced
institutional changes.14 
This Article explores the extent of the change by looking at the ways in 
which asymmetric conflict and legalization have reshaped the theatre of 
hostilities and the implications for the institution of war itself.15 The shift 
from one literal battlefield to multiple and disaggregated battlespaces has 
led to a reconfigured theatre of hostilities,16 which now involves a complex
mix of local and global spaces as well as kinetic and narrative forms of 
combat.17 This re-making of armed hostilities in geographical, material, 
and social terms has increased access to the drama, stage, and audience of 
military theatres. Further, the more globalized and publicized character of 
hostilities has allowed a higher number of actors, and actors of higher 
quality, to participate in and observe hostilities, whether kinetic, narrative, 
or both.18 This has given a powerful platform for law to mediate the 
conduct of warfare, and it is thus unsurprising that the notion of legality 
regularly occupies center stage in a reconstructed theatre of hostilities.19 
Accordingly, military actors, whether state or non-state, are producing 
performances of legality in combat to influence not only their adversaries 
but also, crucially, formal and informal judgments across the theatre’s
more expansive and global audience. The term “performances” does not 
imply cynical theatrics, but rather concerted actions to display legality or
illegality as an integral part of warfare. In this way, such performances of
legality have become a crucial strategic asset for interacting kinetic and
narrative confrontations.20 This has led to a distinctive struggle between
adversaries over appearances of legality and illegality, which has produced 
14. See Charles Garraway, ‘To Kill or Not to Kill?’—Dimensions on the Use of Force, 
14 J. OF CONFLICT & SEC. L. 500, 501 (2010). 
15. See generally Emily Crawford, From Inter-state and Symmetric to Intra-state 
and Asymmetric, 17 Y.B. OF INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 95 (2014) (examining the changing
methods of warfare throughout the 20th century and discussing the changes in law to 
respond these changes). 
 16. Frederic Megret, War and the Vanishing Battlefield, 9 LOY. CHI. U. INT’L L. REV. 
131, 132–33 (2011–2012). 
 17. Michael John-Hopkins, Mapping War, Peace and Terrorism in the Global Information
Environment, 8 J. OF INT’L HUMANITARIAN LEGAL STUD. 202, 204–08 (2017). 
18.  Ayalon et al., supra note 7.
 19. See e.g., Nikolas M. Rajkovic, Tanja Aalberts & Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen,
Introduction: Legality, Interdisciplinarity, and the Study of Practices, in THE POWER OF 
LEGALITY: PRACTICES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THEIR POLITICS 1, 3 (2016). 
20. John-Hopkins, supra note 17, at 213.
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an institutional and narrative battlespace of growing importance that this 
Article conceptualizes as vicarious litigation. 
The Article is organized in five sections. Section I introduces and
elaborates on the related notions of legal performances and vicarious
litigation by bridging sociological theorizing on social performances with 
noted developments in asymmetric warfare. This conceptual effort draws
insight from Performative Sociology21 and the so-called “practice turn” in 
international relations theory.22  Section II describes the origin of vicarious
litigation as flowing from the asymmetric warfare’s disruption of the 
institutional bargain behind modern war and, consequently, International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL). To understand that institutional disruption, 
Section II discusses Andrew Mack’s under-examined inquiry into and 
conceptualization of “asymmetric conflict.”23 Sections III and IV look at
how international lawyers, and specifically IHL scholars, have struggled 
to grasp the rise of asymmetric conflict and how the dominant “lawfare” 
literature has suffered from conceptual straining and the incapacity to 
theorize institutional change precipitated by the prevalence of asymmetric 
conflict. Section V focuses on the novel notions of legal performances and 
vicarious litigation and examines how these novel notions provide alternatives 
to the hobbled semantics of lawfare by offering greater insight into institutional 
mutations that now define the legalization of contemporary warfare. 
I. A RECONFIGURED THEATRE OF HOSTILITIES: LEGAL 
PERFORMANCES AND VICARIOUS LITIGATION 
Since 2008, a series of Gazan wars have involved the entry of Israel 
Defense Forces (IDF) into Gaza for the stated purpose of degrading Hamas 
militarily.24 While each Gazan war represents a discrete and episodic 
military event, this Article argues that this specific sequence of war has 
produced a consistent and signature model of combat. The regularity and 
feedback loops of such wars led one scholar to refer to Palestine-Israel 
21. See generally JEFFREY C. ALEXANDER, PERFORMANCE AND POWER (2011) (building
upon the theory of social performance to analyze how performativity can help studying 
politics and society); see also Jeffrey Alexander et al. eds., SOCIAL PERFORMANCE: 
SYMBOLIC ACTION, CULTURAL PRAGMATICS, AND RITUAL (2006) (describing a new theory 
of social performance). 
22. Emmanuel Adler &Vincent Pouliot, International Practices, 3 INT’L THEORIES 
1 (2011) (“approach[ing] world politics through the lens of its manifold practices . . . define[d] 
as competent performances.”). 
23. See Section II, infra (discussing how Mack theorized the concept of asymmetric
conflict).
24. Jim Zanotti et al., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40101, ISRAEL AND HAMAS: CONFLICT
IN GAZA 2008-2009 2(2009). 
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confrontations as a kind of military “laboratory.”25 This signature model
gains empirical shape by looking at what a prominent international 
newspaper reported in an instance of asymmetric combat during Operation 
Cast Lead.26 An account and mapping of the combat maneuverers made 
by each adversary is described below. 
The IDF identified a multi-level residential building (building) used by 
Hamas allegedly for military purposes. The IDF then classified the Building
as one having a military objective, and consequently it became an airstrike 
target. The IDF obtained telephone numbers of some known residents of 
the Building, and it sent automated voice and text messages—in local Arabic 
—warning of an imminent attack and instructing them to immediately
evacuate. Hamas intercepted those warnings and immediately responded
by sending a crack team of civilian-looking militants and supporters to the 
roof of the Building, so as to complicate the mission for the IDF pilot
assigned to the air strike. The appearance of civilians on the roof visibly 
constituted an invocation of the prohibition against harming civilians 
under the Geneva Convention. However, the military pilot responded by 
launching (or dropping) a specially-designed fake ordinance on the roof, 
which did not explode.27 The fake ordinance scared away, warned, and 
effectively dispersed those civilian-looking individuals on the roof top,28 
and thus cleared the pilot’s view as well as the view from the onboard
video camera. The tactic facilitated a later strike on the building, this time 
using an actual explosive ordinance. 
This scenario is not a random instance but rather an example of a larger
structural change in the contemporary theatre of hostilities.29 It illustrates 
how a hybrid model of combat has evolved,30 where legality assumes 
a foreground, as opposed to a background, position in combat strategy and 
25. ORDE KITTRIE, LAWFARE: LAW AS A WEAPON OF WAR 197 (Oxford Univ. Press, 
2016). 
26. Steven Erlanger, Both Sides in Gaza War Using Lethal New Tricks, N.Y. TIMES 




 29. Derek Gregory, War and Peace, 35 TRANSACTIONS INST. BRIT. GEOGRAPHERS
154, 155–56 (2010). 
30. Robert Wilkie, Hybrid Warfare: Something Old, Not Something New, 23 AIR &
SPACE POWER J. 13, 14 (2009). 
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tactics exercised by adversaries.31 The scenario also exemplifies the nexus 
between military strategy and IHL.32 This Article further contends that this 
interconnection is characterized by a pattern of struggles exceeding the 
popular characterization of “lawfare” as the use or misuse of law to achieve 
a military objective.33 Indeed, warring actors are doing something more 
institutionally and sociologically than using or misusing law: they produce 
performances of legality as an integrated feature of the military theatre, 
and this has engendered a new litigious space of institutional and narrative 
combat encapsulated, described in this Article as vicarious litigation. 
To understand the value of vicarious litigation, it is important to first 
grasp what legal performances are and how such practices now reconfigure
the contemporary theatre of hostilities. This brings us to two key questions:
(1) What does “legal performances” mean? (2) How do competing legal
performances produce vicarious litigation as a new battlespace of narrative 
combat? First, the emphasis on legal performances draws, in part, from a 
history of legalistic discourse and rights-based activism that international 
lawyers already know. Since at least the 1970s, human rights and humanitarian 
norms have been used by state and non-state actors to reshape the international 
system by promoting greater civil and social rights, war crimes accountability 
and even corporate responsibility.34 Public advocacy campaigns have
exposed these efforts, labelled by Keck and Sikkink as “naming and shaming” 
strategies, or the “boomerang effect”: the strategy consists in pressuring 
35 targeted actors to comply with varied kinds of normative obligations.
Moreover, the legality of warfare has evolved considerably beyond these 
initial and groundbreaking models based on interactions between adversaries, 
as well as with activists. The way that powerful militaries have also
harnessed the influence of legal performances,36 and thus appearances, in 
the characterization of specific hostilities,37 is an important factor of change
31. Pascal Vennesson & Nikolas M. Rajkovic, The Transnational Politics of Warfare 
Accountability: Human Rights Watch versus the Israel Defense Forces, 26 INT’L REL. 409, 
412 (2012).
32. Laura A. Dickinson, Military Lawyers on the Battlefield: An Empirical Account 
of International Law Compliance, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 2–3 (2010). 
33. Charles J. Dunlap, Does Lawfare Need an Apologia, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L 
L. 121, 122 (2010). 
34. Margaret Keck & Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders (1998) (arguing
that transnational advocacy networks use human rights to create international change); see 
also Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, & Kathryn Sikkink, THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: 
INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE (1999) (describing the socialization process 
where human rights norms influence state actors); Sanjeev Khagram, James V, Riker & Kathryn 
Sikkink (eds.), Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Movements, Networks, and 
Norms (2002). 
35.  Keck & Sikkink, supra note 34, at 12. 
36. Dickinson, supra note 32. 
37.  Vennesson & Rajkovic, supra note 31, at 410–12. 
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and constitutes an institutional transformation. Then-NATO commander 
General James Jones, in remarks that have since gained particular fame
among IHL scholars, captured this transformation: 
It used to be a simple thing to fight a battle . . . In a perfect world, a general would
get up and say, “Follow me, men,” and everybody would say, “Aye, sir” and run
off. But that’s not the world anymore, . . .[now] you have to have a lawyer or 
a dozen. It’s become very legalistic and very complex.38 
Since Jones’ remarks, the scale and impact of legalization upon warfare
has continued to spread further: state, non-state, and activist entities have
all “lawyered up”39 in different ways and become skilled and adept in enacting 
legal performances with convincing effects. The current strategic, legal, 
and communications environment in which it is difficult for any single 
actor to outright command the legal characterization of hostilities,40 
especially in a political time dominated by social media and the influences 
of so-called “fake news,”41 is a result of these changes,
International lawyers have spent little time theorizing such strategic
interactions and their institutionalizing effects—where warring adversaries 
effectively litigate legal appearances, and thus, weaponize not merely
black-letter law but appearances of legality within real-time combat.42 the
recent growth in the “lawfare” literature provides some insight into that 
profound change, but that represents only a partial window to how legal 
performances have institutionalized a vicarious litigation space within 
active hostilities. In other words, real-time combat often involves simultaneous 
kinetic and litigious dimensions, where legal performances are strategically 
integral to a more complex theatre of hostilities.43 
Analyzing “legal performances” both conceptually and with respect to 
concrete implications for contemporary warfare deepens the understanding 
of that profound change. Conceptually, legal performances should be
understood as patterned actions directed at an organized context and the 
38. Charles J. Dunlap, Lawfare Today: A Perspective, YALE J. OF INT’L AFF. 146, 146
(2008).
39. E.g., Steve Keeva, Lawyers in the War Room, 77 AM. B. ASS’N J. 52, 59 (1991). 
40. See Vennesson & Rajkovic, supra note 31, at 422.
 41. See Bjornstjern Baade, Fake News and International Law, 29 EUR. J. OF INT’L 
L. 1357 (2019). 
42. See Zoltan Buzas, Evading International Law: How Agents Comply with the Letter 
of the Law but Violate its Purpose, 23 EUR. J. OF INT’L REL. 4 (2016). 
43. See, e.g., Safia Swimelar, Deploying Images of Enemy Bodies: US Image Warfare 
and Strategic Narratives, 11 MEDIA, WAR & CONFLICT 179, 179–80 (2018). 
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wider public; the aim is to construct appearances of lawfulness.44 The
chief goal is to build social resonance, recognition, and ultimately to obtain 
validation from a global audience of legal experts, public opinion, and 
sovereign decision-makers.45 To attain that outcome, such performances
appeal to recognized legal interpretations and standards, so as to portray 
obligation, competence, and imperative compliance.46 Further, what makes
legal performances consequential, and thus strategically powerful, is their 
discursive coerciveness. For instance, a military actor produces a compelling 
legal performance during hostilities, e.g., the kinds illustrated earlier by 
the IDF or Hamas, mobilizing a powerful rhetorical frame that frustrates an 
adversary’s ability to provide “socially sustainable rebuttals.”47 Therefore,
competent legal performances generate an impetus where warring adversaries 
identify and value norms of international law as war-fighting assets, leading 
to their incorporation within an integrated and dynamic strategy of kinetic 
and narrative (counter)attack.48 
However, this evolution in narrative combat continues to mutate. Most 
warring adversaries now fight with, or know of, the proverbial legal 
performances “playbook.”49 This new normal has diminished the first-
mover advantage some actors, mostly insurgent, had enjoyed with legal 
performances in real-time combat.50 As such, warring actors, whether state
or non-state, frequently enact legal performances in active hostilities, so 
as to shape public interpretations of events and impact the material capacities 
of their rivals.51 These consistent and ritualized practices have formed a
litigious battlespace where actors vicariously sue and counter-sue each 
other across textual, broadcast, or internet media.52 What results is a continuous
public barrage of legal performances and interpretations, aimed at a global 
matrix of legal experts, activist groups (e.g., Human Rights Watch), and 
para-judicial entities (e.g., UN commissions and human rights rapporteurs),  
53 to build broader legal backing for a warring adversary.
The net impact of this increasingly ritualized struggle is both rhetorical
and material; it also expands the actual theatre of hostilities whenever 
44. ADLER & POULIOT, supra note 22, at 7.
45. Rajkovic et al., Legality, Interdisciplinarity and the Study of Practices, supra note 
19, at 19–20.  
46.  Vennesson & Rajkovic, supra note 31, at 412. 
47.  Jackson & Krebs, supra note 4, at 42. 
48. See Daniel Mann, “I am Spartacus”: Individualising visual media and warfare, 
41 MEDIA, CULTURE AND SOCIETY 39–40 (2019). 
49.  David Kennedy, THE DARK SIDES OF VIRTUE: REASSESSING INTERNATIONAL
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powerful states are engaged in combat. Consequently the so-called “mission
accomplishment” becomes more complex because a litigious battlespace 
enables more actors and actants to enter into the narrative, and possibly
kinetic combat.54 There is a quantitative and qualitative enlargement of 
the audience that may appraise combat conducted.55 Further, the drama of 
vicarious litigation readily occupies center stage, because its adversarial 
process attracts widespread public attention and thus influences which actor 
may claim superior legality to leverage an adversary in combat.  The resulting 
pivotal non-kinetic struggle is the form of legal logistics encountered in 
present-day warfare: military actors must vicariously litigate in order to 
sustain, influence, or augment their kinetic maneuvers on the geographic 
terrains of confrontation.56 Put starkly, a compelling YouTube video, exposing
an episode of potential grave illegality in combat, could have material 
consequences similar to an actual ambush of armed forces during live-fire 
hostilities.57 This example underscores how war and its interactions, as
Lieutenant-General Paul Van Piper explains, became a contest decided by 
far more than simply kinetic confrontation: 
Technology permeates every aspects of war, but the science of war cannot 
account for the dynamic interaction of the physical and moral elements that come
into play, by design or by change, in combat. War will remain predominantly an
art, infused with human will, creativity, and judgment.58 
Re-envisioning the theatre of hostilities, therefore, focuses on a broader and 
multi-dimensional model of kinetic and narrative combat—which pays 
attention to the salience of legal performances and the clash of their competing 
productions. Defining legality in light of contemporary warfare requires 
deeper investigation into the wider theatre of actors, spectators, and actants
that struggle over, socially and juridically, when a combatant is or is not 
in a perceived state of legal conformity. The outcomes of vicarious litigation 
are shaped by the public struggles between coalitions of actors, of differing 
capabilities, each intent upon realizing and validating specific characterizations
54. Charles Dunlap Jr., Lawfare: A Decisive Element of 21st-Century Conflicts, 54
JOINT FORCES QUARTERLY 34, 35 (2009). 
55. See Sebastian Kaempf, The Mediatisation of War in a Transforming Global
Media Landscape, 67 AUSTL. J. OF INT’L AFF. 586, 592 (2013). 
56. See Neve Gordon, Human Rights as a Security Threat: Lawfare and the Campaign 
against Human Rights NGOs, 48 LAW & SOCIETY REV. 311, 326 (2014). 
57. See JAN MIESZKOWSKI, WATCHING WAR 232 (2012). 
58. Paul K. Van Riper, Information Superiority, MARINE CORPS GAZETTE (June 1,
1997), https://mca-marines.org/gazette/information-superiority/ [https://perma.cc/MLM7-LTMX]. 
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of legality in combat over competing frames and possibilities.59 Public
struggles with major strategic importance because the notion of legality is 
used to influence public perceptions of correct military intervention and 
conduct. Legality, in this more dynamic context, becomes less about 
demonstrating blackletter compliance with IHL and more about how rival 
legal performances seek to impose governing appearances of illegality or 
lawfulness.60 Ultimately, a meta-war of words and narratives becomes 
enacted through different types of vicarious litigation operating integrally 
with military operations. 
II. ORIGINS OF VICARIOUS LITIGATION: ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT 
AND WAR’S DISRUPTED BARGAIN 
The notable rise of vicarious litigation probably falls among what some 
scholars have described as a crisis afflicting the core “bargain” behind
IHL.61 The notion of bargain refers to how prominent regimes in international
law, e.g., the United Nations Charter or the World Trade Organization, 
are based on key actors agreeing upon essential assumptions of norms and 
rules that govern the applicable institutional framework.62 Similarly, IHL
is no different. IHL’s underlying bargain has centered pivotally on battlefield 
victory as the universal aim of warring parties. The resulting bargain 
compromised between military necessity and the protection of human life, 
where the right to kill gains legal sanction whenever performed for military 
advantage and, crucially, victory.63 However, compromising human life,
in recent times, has shown signs of fraying from what seems a decisively 
new strategic context. Nicolas Lamp explains: 
The understanding of IHL as a compromise between the interests of the warring 
parties and humanitarian concerns is at the heart of IHL’s traditional paradigm . . . .
This understanding, however, is . . . based on the ‘old’ conception of war. When
the aim of military victory ceases to be the only or even primary motivation for
fighting, as is often the case in the ‘new wars’, the fundamental principles of IHL 
change their character in terms of their factual relevance for the conduct of war
(the principle of proportionality), their compatibility with the interests of the
59. See Pascal Vennesson, War Under Transnational Surveillance: Framing Ambiguity
and the Politics of Shame, 40 REV. INT’L STUD. 30, 34–35 (2014). 
60. See Roger Stahl, What the Drone Saw: The Cultural Optics of the Unmanned
War, 67 AUSTL. J. INT’L AFF. 654, 659–60 (2013) 
61. See Ian Clark, Sebastian Kaempf, Christian Reus-Smit & Emily Tannock, Crisis in
the Laws of War? Beyond Compliance and Effectiveness, 24 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 319, 321 
(2017).
62. Id. at 330. 
63. See Michael N. Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity in International
Humanitarian Law: Preserving the Delicate Balance, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 795, 796–98 (2010). 
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warring parties (the principle of distinction), and thus their sustainability to serve
as the foundations of a legal system that relies on voluntary compliance.64 
Within this dynamic, the notion of vicarious litigation strengthens because 
it is a parcel of a larger institutional transformation surrounding warfare.
Explaining the novel strategic logic driving change, and its implication
for the historical assumption and bargain behind IHL, are important to 
understand the new strategy. For international lawyers, this requires a 
foregrounding of recent military history and five decades of wars spanning
from Algeria to Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Gaza. These conflicts are
often lumped under the generic label of “asymmetric warfare,”65 with the
term representing a loose empirical marker for much scholarship across 
International Law and International Relations (IR). More recently, the 
term “asymmetric warfare” has also been applied to so-called counter-insurgency 
groups or “war on terror” campaigns conducted in, for example, Afghanistan, 
66 Iraq, or Somalia.
Yet, when one further investigates into the adjective and its origin,
asymmetric warfare is the stem of a prior analytical concept—“asymmetric
conflict”. In the mid-1970s political scientist Andrew Mack developed the 
concept of asymmetric conflict to theorize a remarkable pattern of military
defeats inflicted on French and American forces in North Africa and 
Southeast Asia.67 Correspondingly, Mack conceptualized asymmetric conflict
to explain how states with overwhelmingly superior military forces lose 
wars in places like Algeria and Vietnam.68 Put differently, militaries so 
capable of battlefield victories managed to consistently lose wars of vital 
interest because of asymmetric conflict.69 
64. Nicolas Lamp, Conceptions of War and Paradigms of Compliance: The ‘New
War’ Challenge to International Humanitarian Law, 16 J. CONFLICT AND SECURITY L. 225, 
243 (2011).
65. E.g., Michael Schmitt, Asymmetrical Warfare and International Humanitarian 
Law, 62 A.F. L. REV. 1, 2 (2008); Eyal Benvenisti, The Law of Asymmetric Warfare, in 
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOR OF W. MICHAEL 
REISMAN 931; James R. Orr, Counterinsurgency Law: New Directions in Asymmetric Warfare, 
19 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 763, 763 (2013); see also Ryder McKeown, Legal Asymmetries 
in Asymmetric War, 41 REV. OF INT’L STUD. 117 (2015). 
 66. Benjamin Lockes, Bad Guys Know What Works: Asymmetric Warfare in the Third 
Offset, TEXAS NAT’L SECURITY REVIEW (June 23, 2015), https://warontherocks.com/2015/
06/bad-guys-know-what-works-asymmetric-warfare-and-the-third-offset/. 
67. See Andrew Mack, Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric
Conflict, 27 WORLD POL. 175, 175 (1975). 
68. See id. at 175–76 (1975). 
69. See id. 
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For Mack, asymmetric conflict does not derive from examining how 
military superiority was misapplied, but from understanding: (1) a radical 
change in how certain actors (state and non-state) view the nature and
purpose of military violence; and (2) how those conceptions diverged
from the established paradigm of war’s purpose and aim.70 The ensuing
gaps became exploited by allegedly inferior insurgents to produce a 
remarkable pattern of military outcomes.71 Accordingly, Mack’s concept
and theory of asymmetric conflict offers an explanation resolving how 
these historical defeats derived less from conventional military factors than 
from accurately illustrated fundamental change to the core assumption that 
defined the modern institution of war—battlefield victory.72 To understand 
this change’s foreseeable implications on the underlying premise and 
bargain behind the IHL regime, looking at what Mack revealed in terms 
of the larger strategic and, ultimately, normative impacts of asymmetric 
conflict as an increasingly prevalent genre of war helps.
Mack’s distinction between asymmetric and symmetric conflicts is a 
radically altered structure of confrontation. Profound differences in “resource
power” between the superior military actor and the materially weaker insurgent
actor73 and the inability of insurgents to deliver a direct threat, e.g., by 
launching a conventional military attack or invasion against the superior 
military foe are the two key factors to define asymmetric conflict.74 The
implication is a unique strategic setting with different logics of “victory” 
for each of the asymmetric belligerents.75 From the superior military actor’s
perspective, the theatre of hostilities became extended into public and 
domestic politics, because “a war with no visible payoff against an opponent 
who poses no direct threat will come under increasing criticism as . . . costs 
escalate.”76 From the insurgent actor’s perspective, in contrast, military 
violence was the purpose, with its new, extended opportunity to negate 
the thrust of conventional military superiority. As Mack explained: 
Lacking the technological capacity or the basic resources to destroy the external
enemy’s military capability, [insurgents] must [sic] of necessity aim to destroy
his political capability. If the external power’s “will” to continue the struggle is
destroyed, then its military capability—no matter how powerful—is totally
irrelevant. . . .
To paraphrase Clausewitz, politics may become the continuation of war by other
means. Therefore [sic] the military struggle on the ground must be evaluated not 
70. See id. at 175–77. 
71.  See id. at 177, 182, 185. 
72. See id. at 177, 195. 
73. Id. at 182. 
74. Id. at 181. 
75. See id. at 180–82, 195. 
76. Id. at 185. 
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in terms of the narrow calculus of military tactics, but in terms of its political
impact in the metropolis: “Battles and campaigns are amenable to analysis as
rather self-contained contests of military power . . . . By contrast, the final outcome of
wars depends on a much wider range of factors, many of them highly elusive—
such as the war’s impact on domestic politics.”77 
In sum, what Mack brought to light was a vastly different teleology that
asymmetric conflicts induce. This flowed from how “winning” in the
asymmetric context required a complex mix of both military and political
victories. In other words, strategy became less about destroying military
capability and more about undermining an adversary’s political capability
and will to wage war. Mack’s quote of Henry Kissinger on the Vietnam 
War emphasized this shift: “[The United States] fought a military war; our 
opponents fought a political one. We sought physical attrition; our opponents 
aimed for our psychological exhaustion.”78 Accordingly, the change in purpose
and strategy invoked a novel methodology, which prioritized political 
attrition over military attrition and the imperative to inflict a “steady
accumulation of ‘costs’” against the adversary.79 This emphasis on political
attrition required an understanding of how unconventional “victories” could 
be obtained, even through situations of military stalemate or defeat since 
the social significance of battles and hostilities went beyond their outcome 
80as “self-contained contests of military power.”  As Mack illustrated, political
over simply military impact became essential in asymmetric conflicts: 
the aim of insurgents is not the destruction of the military capability of their
opponents as an end in itself. To attempt such a strategy would be lunatic for a 
small Third-World power facing a major industrial power. Direct costs become 
of strategic importance when, and only when, they are translated into indirect
costs. These are psychological and political; their objective is to amplify the
“contradictions in the enemy’s camp.81 
III. LAMENT AND INDIGNATION: NEW WARS, LAWFARE AND IHL’S 
NARRATIVE STRUGGLE WITH ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT 
The shift from battlefield victory to infliction of political costs had 
wide-ranging implications, extending beyond military strategy into the broader 
institutional and normative practice of war, with the scale of implication later
77. Id. at 179–80. 
78. Id. at 184. 
79. Id. at 185. 
80. Id. at 184–86. 
81. Id. at 185. 
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reaching and entering the purview of IHL scholarship, albeit considerably
after political science. Yet, what distinguishes that legal literature on
asymmetric conflict are distinct postures that this Article characterizes as
lament versus indignation. The former variant manifests as a sub-literature 
on so-called “New Wars,” and the latter variant produces a very extensive
and influential scholarship on lawfare. 
This section considers whether those respective postures, and their related 
sub-literatures, have missed a deeper institutional mutation incurred by 
asymmetric conflicts, which the author’s review of Mack’s work attempts 
to make visible. In other words, have lament and indignation across the 
IHL literature distracted from a richer conceptual and legal observation
vis-à-vis the conduct of asymmetric hostilities? Have existing narratives 
deployed by international lawyers come at the price of obscuring a novel
institutionalization that flows out of vicarious litigation? To address such
questions, some mapping is useful on the sub-literatures, and their perceptions
of asymmetric conflict and its institutional impacts. This involves sketching 
key assertions made across each branch of scholarship. Notably, what
unites both sub-literatures are a register of crisis, yet each perception is driven
by different logics of consequence and visions of remedy. 
The “New Wars” scholarship (NWS), driven by eminent scholars like 
Antonio Cassesse82 and Cherif Bassiouni,83 presents asymmetric conflict 
as a radical development posing a profound compliance dilemma.84 The
NWS frames the emergence of asymmetric conflict as an external challenger 
for IHL’s established rules, producing architectural upheaval because 
“almost all modern armed conflicts are asymmetric.”85 Correspondingly,
asymmetrical conflict is portrayed as an usurping warfare, where “asymmetry 
compels [insurgent actors] to resort to unconventional and unlawful means 
and methods of warfare as the only way to redress the military and economic 
86imbalance they face.”  Furthermore, structural collision  is the overriding
characterization since the interests of insurgent actors are theorized as 
incompatible with how military necessity is presumed under the law of 
82. Antonio Cassesse, Current Challenges to International Humanitarian Law in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT 4–19 (Andrew 
Clapham et al. eds., 2014). 
83. M. Cherif Bassiouni, The New Wars and the Crisis of Compliance with the Law
of Armed Conflict by Non-State Actors, 98 J. OF CRIM. LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY 711–810 
(2008). 
84. See George R. Lucas Jr., “New Rules for New Wars” International Law and
Just Wart Doctrine for Irregular War, 43 CASE W. RES. J. OF INT’L L. 677, 702 (2011); see 
also Miriam Bradley, International Humanitarian Law, Non-State Armed Groups and the 
International Committee of the Red Cross in Colombia, 4 J. OF INT’L HUMANITARIAN LEGAL 
STUD. 108, 131 (2013). 
85. CASSESE, supra note 82, at 8. 
86. BASSIOUNI, supra note 83, at 714–15. 
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armed conflict. The outlook advanced, therefore, is one of historic predicament, 
fueled by a dominant view that “lacunae” in IHL leave insurgent actors 
outside the institutional framework, and thus incentivize others to undermine
the established laws of war. As illustrated by the United Nations Secretary- 
General, this has cultivated institutional lament over the perceived gap
between the existing institutional order and the prevalence of asymmetric 
conflicts: “[i]mproved compliance with international humanitarian law 
and human rights law will always remain a distant prospect in the absence 
of, and absent acceptance of the need for, systematic and consistent engagement
with non-state armed groups.”87 
The lawfare scholarship, by contrast, has developed an alternate narrative
that emphasizes how asymmetric conflicts represent an internal, and not 
external, challenge for IHL’s institutional framework. Accordingly, instead 
of doctrinal lacunae and architectural crisis, the focus is on legally-savvy
actors, e.g., insurgents, and how they are instrumentalizing—or even gaming 
—the established laws of war.88  This flows from a systemic confluence
of asymmetric conflict with legalization, which has generated novel military 
practices that use and abuse the IHL framework. Yet, lawfare scholarship 
is fragmented on the ramifications of law’s infusion into asymmetric 
conflicts, being divided largely between two conceptual approaches that 
emphasize what scholars have called reflexive89 versus structural90 lawfare. 
As a result, a more extensive and wide-ranging scholarship has developed 
relative to the NWS, driven by an exceptional interchange between military 
and civilian scholars on how to interpret law’s entry into asymmetric warfare 
and, correspondingly, sustain IHL’s institutional coherence vis-à-vis the 
91 specter of internal misuse.
We need to grasp how lawfare emerged as a term, and specifically the
way a conceptual cleavage structures what has become a popular lawfare 
 87. U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in
armed conflict, ¶ 11 U.N. Doc. S/2010/579 (Nov. 11, 2010). 
88. See CASSESE, supra note 82, at 1, 7, 10. 
89. Wouter G. Werner, The Curious Career of Lawfare, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L 
L. 61, 68 (2010). 
90.  Dale Stephens, The Age of Lawfare, 87 INT’L L. STUD. 327, 330 (2011). 
91. See, e.g., Andres B. Munoz Mosquera & Sacha Dov Bachmann, Lawfare in 
Hybrid Wars: The 21st Century Warfare, 7 J. INT’L HUMANITARIAN LEGAL STUD. 63 (2016); 
Michael T. Palmer & J. Michael Johnson, Undersea Lawfare: Can the U.S. Navy Fall 
Victim to This Asymmetric Warfare Threat?, 69 NAVAL WAR C. REV. 135 (2016); Michael 
A. Newton, Illustrating Illegitimate Lawfare, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 255 (2010); 
William A. Schabas, Gaza, Goldstone and Lawfare, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 307 (2010). 
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sub-literature. Pivotally, the term lawfare did not originate from scholarship,
rather it entered academic vocabulary via the United States Air Force and, 
specifically, via the office of the Judge Advocate General (JAG).92 The
term was popularized at the turn of the millennium by Major General 
Charles J. Dunlap in a series of speeches and writings, where, in Dunlap’s 
words, he advanced: “a ‘bumper sticker’ term easily understood by a variety 
of audiences to describe how law was altering warfare.”93 This “bumper
sticker” strategy proved wildly successful because it came to dominate 
both societal and scholarly discourses. To illustrate the semantic impact, 
for instance, consider the is instructive: a search today of lawfare generates 
over 900,000 returns in Google,94 over sixty academic articles or chapters 
in Thompson Reuters Web of Science,95 a Wikipedia definition,96 a highly 
prolific Lawfare blog,97 but, remarkably, no entry in the Oxford English 
Dictionary.98 As Sadat and Geng explain, lawfare is distinguished by a
remarkable paradox, where its rhetorical omnipresence is equaled by a 
commensurate lack of etymological meaning: 
Analyzing the terms reveals that ‘law’ is defined as ‘a rule of conduct imposed
by authority’ while ‘fare’ is an Old English, now archaic, word meaning a voyage
or expedition. Thus, ‘herring-fare’ would be an obsolete way of referring to a ‘voyage
to catch herrings.’ In the same vein, ‘warfare means going to war . . . the action of
carrying on, or engaging in, war.’ Using this method, ‘lawfare’ would indicate a 
voyage into law. However, the term is probably more accurately described as a play 
on the word ‘warfare.’99 
This bit of etymological history becomes relevant for more than your next 
game of Scrabble.100 Specifically, sizable conceptual stretching was involved 
when lawfare jumped from “bumper sticker” to a term of art within 
international law scholarship. It merits asking whether international lawyers 
were attentive to the consequences of that jump, where, effectively, a play 
on words became a conceptual framework for an influential scholarship 
92. Freya Irani, ‘Lawfare’, US military discourse, and the colonial constitution of
law and war, 3 EUR. J. INT’L SECURITY 113, 113 (2017). 
93. Dunlap, Lawfare Today: A Perspective, supra note 38, at 146.
 94. GOOGLE, http://www.google.com (search “lawfare” to retrieve “About 1,460,000 
results”) (last visited Feb. 26, 2020). 
95. WEB OF SCIENCE, www.webofknowledge.com (search “lawfare” to retrieve 61
results) (last visited June 12, 2019). 
96. Lawfare, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lawfare (last visited Feb.
26, 2020). 
97. LAWFARE BLOG – HARD NATIONAL SECURITY CHOICE, https://www.lawfareblog.com 
[https://perma.cc/7DCU-FNAW] (last visited Feb. 18, 2020). 
98. Leila Nadya Sadat & Jing Geng, On Legal Subterfuge and the So-Called
Lawfare Debate, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 153, 156 (2010). 
99. Id. 
100. William A. Schabas, Gaza, Goldstone, and Lawfare, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L 
L. 307, 308 (2010). 
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of IHL. This becomes significant when one understands what Giovanni 
Sartori, another political scientist, identified as the tendency toward 
“conceptual straining” across the social sciences.101 As Sartori explains, 
reliance on highly abstract terms, like lawfare, risk over-extension in relation 
to empirical developments because, “the net result of conceptual straining 
is that our gains in extensional coverage tend to be matched by losses in 
connotative precision. It appears that we can cover more—in travelling 
terms—only by saying less, and by saying less in a far less precise manner.”102 
Why is “conceptual straining” relevant vis-a-vis lawfare in scholarly
analyses? The implication is more apparent when one looks closer at the 
two dominant strands of reflexive and structural lawfare. This loops us
back to the founding posture of indignation from which lawfare emerged 
as a concept and stimulated an eventual reflexive scholarship. The term
sprung, literally, into popularity via indignation, which Major-General 
Dunlap openly acknowledged as the rationale behind his initial promotion 
of lawfare as a “bumper sticker.”103 This was illustrated in Dunlap’s landmark
paper presented at Harvard’s Carr Center for Human Rights in 2001, where 
lawfare was first described as a term expressing military indignation as 
well as a policy in pursuit of some legal scholarship: 
Lawfare describes a method of warfare where law is used as a means of realizing
a military objective. Though at first blush one might assume lawfare would result 
in less suffering in war (and sometimes does), in practice it too often produces
behaviors that jeopardize the protection of the truly innocent. There are many
dimensions to lawfare, but the one ever more frequently embraced by U.S.
opponents is a cynical manipulation of the rule of law and the humanitarian values
it represents. Rather than seeking battlefield victories, per se, challengers try to
destroy the will to fight by undermining public support that is indispensable when
democracies like the U.S. conduct military interventions. A principle way of bringing
about that end is to make it appear that the U.S. is waging war in violation of the 
letter or spirit of LOAC.104 
101. Giovanni Sartori, Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics, 64 THE AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 1033, 1034 (1970). 
102. Id. at 1035. 
103. Dunlap, Lawfare Today: A Perspective, supra note 38, at 146. 
104. Charles J. Dunlap Jr., Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian
Values in 21st Century Conflicts, Paper Presented to the Humanitarian Challenges 
in Military Intervention Conference 4, 11 (Nov. 29, 2001) [hereinafter Dunlap, Law and 
Military Interventions]. 
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IV. CONCEPTUAL STRAINING AND THE LIMITS OF LAWFARE
The scholarly traction Dunlap gained following that proverbial launch 
at Harvard was near immediate and well-documented, giving rise to an 
initial generation of lawfare work that emphasized its instrumentality and 
bad faith.105 Notably, at the vanguard was a hyper-instrumental and pejorative
type of theorizing, which, as Dunlap echoes above, mirrored the political 
logic of attrition as elaborated by Mack to political scientists three decades 
earlier.106 
But within IHL, reflexive lawfare made no reference to Mack’s theorizing 
on asymmetric conflict; instead, its theory of naked instrumentalism was 
developed by a separate cohort of legal academics and advocates107 led by 
Harvard scholar and one-time Bush administration advisor, Jack Goldsmith: 
“various nations, NGO’s, academics, international organizations, and others 
in the international community have been busily weaving a web of international 
and judicial institutions that today threatens [United States government] 
interests.”108 
Yet, the academic life of lawfare has been richer than this opening and 
influential generation of reflexive scholarship. This explains why Dunlap’s
later work migrated to a different conceptualization of structural lawfare.
The scholarly purpose behind that shift is less of a focus on alleged misuses 
of law, and instead a focus on making “sense of the changing security
environment in which militaries—primarily Western—had to operate.”109 
Dunlap’s migration reflects a turn in research to less ideological theorizing, 
as exemplified by David Kennedy’s work on lawfare that examined both
positive and negative implications flowing from IHL’s “routinization” in
contemporary warfare.110 There was general recognition that warring state
and non-state actors all use law to serve strategic purposes, which suggested 
the need for “managing law and war together.”111 As Dunlap expressed in 
105. See, e.g., Eric Talbot Jensen, Combatant Status: It is Time for Intermediate Levels
of Recognition for Partial Compliance, 46 VA. J. OF INT’L L. 209, 210 (2005) (discussing 
Dunlap’s paper).
106. Dunlap, Law and Military Interventions, supra note 104, at 11. 
107. See Alan Dershowitz & Elizabeth Samson, The Chilling Effect of ‘Lawfare’ 
Litigation, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 9 2010), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/ 
libertycentral/2010/feb/09/libel-reform-radical-islamic-groups [https://perma.cc/736N-UTPF];
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., NAT’L DEFENSE STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 5 
(2005); Matthew S. Cohen & Chuck D. Freilich, War By Other Means: the Delegitimization 
Campaign Against Israel, 24 ISRAEL AFF. 1, 10–14 (2018). 
108. JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE 
BUSH ADMINISTRATION 60 (2009). 
109. Werner, supra note 89, at 66. 
110. See DAVID KENNEDY, OF WAR AND LAW 41 (2006). 
111. See id. at 125. 
452
RAJKOVIC (DO NOT DELETE) 6/5/2020 4:47 PM    
 






















[VOL. 21:  435, 2020] Performing “Legality” 
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
retrospect, lawfare had evolved from a vocabulary of normative disapproval to
a managerial and critical discourse on the implications of war’s legalization:
Although I’ve tinkered with the definition over the years, I now define “lawfare” 
as the strategy of using—and misusing—law as a substitute for traditional military 
means to achieve an operational objective. As such, I view law in this context much
the same as a weapon. It is a means that can be used for good and bad purposes . . . .
Today’s international commerce requires an extensive legal architecture to function,
and this fact operates to raise the “legal consciousness”, so to speak, of the entire
world community. As we have seen before, such trends in global affairs tend to
spill over into warfare.112 
However, several questions arise. Did Dunlap overstate lawfare’s actual 
renovation? To what extent had a narrative makeover mitigated the legacy
of indignation, and retooled lawfare’s analysis on the “extensive legal
architecture” behind contemporary war? These questions push Sartori’s
earlier quote back into focus on the problem of abstraction and conceptual 
strain in the social sciences, with lawfare being a case in point. The one-
time bumper sticker had travelled far within legal and especially IHL 
scholarship and flowed from semantics of “saying less in a far less precise
manner.”113 The notable gain of lawfare convened a fragmented scholarship, 
involving both hyper-instrumental and critical clusters of literature. Yet, 
this left a sizable portion of IHL’s scholarship on asymmetric conflict that 
is analytically vulnerable because institutional analysis was boxed within 
a play on words.114 With scholars hooked on the semantics of lawfare, nearly 
every development regarding law and asymmetric conflict could be reduced 
into some variant of lawfare. This overuse and strain effectively stunted 
vocabulary and analytical insights into evolving institutional dynamics 
between law and asymmetric conflict. As Dunlap illustrated in his preceding 
quote, lawfare was expressed as law being a “weapon” but later tied to a 
wider legal “architecture”115 without theorizing the relationship and simultaneity 
between those diverse meanings. 
Consequently, novel terms like legal performances and vicarious litigation
represent important means of conceptual leverage useful for confronting 
lawfare’s semantic success via a mirror of conceptual poverty. This requires 
piecing together what both Mack and Dunlap have revealed (to different 
disciplinary audiences) on the mutations grafted by asymmetric conflict 
112. Dunlap, Lawfare Today: A Perspective, supra note 38, at 146. 
113. See Sartori, supra note 101, at 1035. 
114. Sadat & Geng, supra note 99, at 156. 
115. Dunlap, Lawfare Today: A Perspective, supra note 38, at 146–47. 
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onto the established laws of wars. In this light, both NWS and lawfare 
literature missed a key observation due to their dominant postures of
lament and indignation. Asymmetric conflicts have produced institutional 
mutations to the existing framework of IHL, which are neither exclusively
external or internal to the IHL system of rules.116 The strategic emphasis 
on political attrition over battlefield victory radically expanded possibilities of 
unconventional combat victories, which have made legal appearances—
as opposed to military outcomes—a major dimension in often globalized 
theatres of armed hostilities. 
The problem is that the theorizing of lawfare lacks conceptual depth to 
translate the extent of institutional change. Foremost, there are fundamental 
gaps vis-à-vis the kinds of power lawfare articulates and theorizes, and
specifically, what value-added the concept provides to understand the
dynamics of institutional power in asymmetric conflicts. The significance 
of that gap becomes clearer with Barnett and Duvall’s explanation of 
compulsory versus institutional power: 
. . .[I]nstitutional power is an actors’ control of others in indirect ways.
Specifically, the conceptual focus here is on the formal and informal institutions
that mediate between A and B, as A, working through the rules and procedures
that define those institutions guides, steers, and constrains the actions (and nonactions) 
and conditions of existence of others. 
Thus compulsory and institutional power differ in the following ways . . . .
[C]ompulsory power typically rests on the resources that are deployed by A to 
exercise power directly over B, A cannot necessarily be said to “possess” the 
institution that constrains and shapes B . . . . [R]are is the institution that is completely
dominated by one actor.117 
This definition highlights the void incurred by lawfare’s attempt to strain
around the concept of institutional power. We can even see that straining 
at work when lawfare is, to use Dunlap’s term, tinkered into “managing”
law’s interventions in asymmetric conflicts,118 or investigating IHL’s
“routinization” in contemporary warfare. A deeper look at institutional 
power points to how lawfare’s semantics have distracted from theorizing 
law’s use relative to different forms of power in asymmetric conflicts and 
warfare. The question that follows, conceptually, is how to move past 
lawfare’s notional grip? 
There is a signpost, this Article argues, standing already within Dunlap’s
revised definition of lawfare: “the strategy of using—or misusing—law as a
116. See Section 3: Lament and Indignation: New Wars, Lawfare and IHL’s narrative
struggle with Asymmetric Conflict, supra at 15. 
117. Michael Barnett & Raymond Duvall, Power in International Politics, 59 INT’L 
ORG. 39, 51 (2005). 
118. Dunlap, Lawfare Today: A Perspective, supra note 38, at 146. 
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substitute for traditional military means to achieve an operational 
objective.”119 Few have examined Dunlap’s definition to evaluate how he
theorizes power, and still fewer have placed his definition relative to 
Barnett and Duvall’s distinction between compulsory and institutional 
power. In doing so, what sticks out is the way Dunlap’s definition relies, 
explicitly, on a compulsory rather than an institutional theory of power.120 
This is curious. First, law and IHL have an inherent institutional quality.
Second, lawfare originated from indignation over the (alleged) institutional
misuse of law to further extra-legal objectives.121 Third, Dunlap’s definition
operates presumably in a relational context, where warring adversaries use 
or misuse law interactively against each other to achieve a military objective.122 
Thus, translated into the language of Barnett and Duvall above, each adversary
attempts to leverage institutional power, via the rules and procedures of 
IHL, in order to influence “the actions (and nonactions)” of their opponents.123 
V. CONCLUSION: VICARIOUS LITIGATION AS A NOVEL 
INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND BATTLESPACE 
This is where legal performances and vicarious litigation re-enter the 
picture as better conceptual means for accessing that contest over law’s
institutional power in warfare. Warring parties each seek to mobilize, in 
different ways, the institutional rules of IHL. However, to call that simply
“lawfare” and end the analysis there would let too much of the institutional 
struggle escape from view. In particular, we lose sight of the major 
institutional, or quasi-institutional, contest at play: state and non-actors 
enact legal performances to construct compelling appearances of legality, 
or illegality, within the theatre of hostilities. The big challenge, as Barnett
and Duvall underline, is that no state or non-state actor physically, or
normatively, possesses an international institution, like IHL, as its own.
Rather, there is only a “rare” possibility of dominating the institution,124 
by knowing how to direct an institutional apparatus versus an adversary
with like intentions and skills. 
119. Dunlap, Does Lawfare Need an Apologia?, supra note 33, at 122. 
120. Barnett & Duvall, supra note 117, at 51–52. 
121. See Dunlap, Law and Military Interventions, supra note 104, at 4. 
122. Dunlap, Does Lawfare Need an Apologia?, supra note 33, at 122. 
123. Barnett & Duvall, supra note 117, at 51. 
124. Id. 
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Accordingly, the crowning metaphor behind lawfare’s scholarship, i.e. 
law as a physical “weapon”, becomes misleading, because it ignores how 
IHL operates as an institutional, rather than simply compulsory, means of 
power in asymmetric conflicts. This helps explain the notable rise of legal 
performances because warring actors seek to mobilize the institutional 
authority of IHL by broadcasting vicarious legal claims and counterclaims. 
Each adversary seeks to discursively and legally master IHL as an institutional 
and indirect means of waging (narrative) combat. And the nature of that
struggle intensifies as more actors see legal performances as a useful means 
of institutional power, political attrition and, crucially, indirect control. 
The end result for today’s theatre of hostilities is that vicarious litigation 
has become an integral battlespace and a novel institutional mutation of
IHL’s framework, that works influentially between kinetic and narrative 
combat. Yet, there is a darker implication to this distinctive outgrowth of 
legalization. Vicarious litigation can readily escalate into a vortex of militarized
legalism with no actual court for resolution, which, while proliferating
references to legality, paradoxically disables the institutional coherence, 
authority and power of IHL in real-time combat. The legalization of war 
along such an institutional trajectory translates into a different kind of 
normative conquest, which deviates from what international lawyers likely
presumed with law’s active integration into present-day warfare: legal
performances and vicarious litigation as institutional extensions of combat
by other means. 
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